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This paper investigates which policies CIS countries need to reform when they accede to GATT.
The objectives to be pursued through trade policy (e.g. raising fiscal revenue, protecting industries,
regional integration) must be defined clearly when tariff levels are bound. Some streamlining (e.g.
tariffication of export quotas) is also required. The format of regional integration with Russia (free
trade area vs. customs union with joint GATT membership) must not discriminate against GATT
contracting parties, and will be influenced by whether Russia is willing to export energy at its low
domestic price. Furthermore, systemic reforms need to be accelerated to dispel concerns about
discrimination against imports, or hidden subsidies for exports.
Keywords: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; CIS countries; Belarus; trade policy reform;
economic integration; systemic reform.
JEL Classification: F14, F15
Zusammenfassung
GATT-Mitgliedschaft und wirtschaftspolitische Reformen in den GUS-Staaten: der Fall
WeiBruflland. - Es wird untersucht, welche wirtschaftspolitischen Reformen durch die angestrebte
GATT-Mitgliedschaft der GUS-Mitgliedslander notwendig werden. Die Bindung von Zollen im
Rahmen des GATT setzt voraus, daB die grundlegende Ausrichtung der Handelspolitik klarer
definiert wird (Erzielung von Zolleinnahmen, Zollschutz, regionale Integration). Daneben sind
technische Anderungen wie die Tarifierung von Exportquoten erforderlich. Die handelspolitische
Integration mit RuBland (entweder als Freihandelszone oder Zollunion mit gemeinsamer GATT-
Mitgliedschaft) darf keine Diskriminierungen gegen GATT Venragsparteien beinhalten und hangt
wesentlich von der Bereitschaft RuBlands ab, seine Exportpreise fur Energie auf das russische
Inlandsniveau abzusenken. SchlieBlich muB der wirtschaftliche EinfluB des Staates weiter
verringert werden, ran den Verdacht diskriminierender Behandlung von Importen oder
ungercchtfertigter Subventionen fur Exporte auszuraumen.1. Introduction*
It is widely accepted that the integration of the Newly Independent States into the international
division of labour is an essential part of the process of economic transformation and reform. Until
1991 there was a high degree of integration among the member republics of the former Soviet
Union, but little integration with the rest of the world. That isolation was a result, first, of the desire
of Soviet decision-makers to maximise the role of central planning in the economy. Second, during
the Cold War barriers were erected to trade in strategic products, widely defined, by member
countries of both the North Atlantic and Warsaw Treaty Organisations. With the transition to a
market economy, trade with the rest of the world can be expected to gain in importance relative to
trade among the Newly Independent States. At the same time, trade among the NIS will remain
important because of geographic proximity, similar demand structures, and cultural, infrastructural
and traditional supply links.
Successful integration into the international division of labour depends on market access in partner
countries. The multilateral trading system contained in the GATT has for several decades provided
a stable framework for maintaining and enhancing market access on a mutual basis. By obliging
governments to abide by a set of rules in the conduct of their trade policies, the GATT also acts as a
counterweight to the influence of special interest groups demanding protection through trade
policy. Acceding to the GATT is therefore an essential aspect of the integration of the NTS into the
world economy.
At the time of writing, among the Newly Independent States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia,
and Moldova have formally applied to join the GAIT or WTO.
1 Although negotiations in the
Working Parties representing GATT contracting parties have not progressed very far, it is already
clear that key policies will frequently have to be reformed to achieve conformity with GATT. This
paper discusses the case of Belarus, but the issues are similar, mutatis mutandis, for the remaining
countries. Section 2 gives an overview over the external trade of Belarus since 1992. Section 3
describes the trade and exchange rate regime in Belarus and points out which modifications are
required to eliminate inconsistencies with the GATT treaty. Section 4 discusses the policy options
for intra-CIS trade policy integration. Section 5 investigates in which areas of systemic reform
This paper draws on the author's participation in several research projects on ihe external trade regimes of the
Newly Independent States. To a large extent this paper is based on information provided orally or in the form of
internal working documents by research economists, academics, and government officials in Belarus and
elsewhere. Whilst every effort has been made to doublecheck information, changing circumstances and different
perspectives of the persons contacted (as regards, for example, the letter of the law vs. current practice) may lead
to inaccuracies. The author is grateful for any clarifications or corrections, and expresses his sincere gratitude to
the many people who have contributed to this paper by providing comments or information. Discussions with
Daniel Gros and Rolf J. Langhammer have been particularly helpful. Nevertheless, the views expressed are solely
the author's.
1 Since the "old", 1947 GATT is now superseded by the World Trade Organization, these countries will have to join
the WTO directly. Apart from the "traditional" GATT issues related to trade in goods, accession to the WTO will
require negotiations in areas such as services and intellectual property rights. These, however, are analytically
separate issues and are not dealt within this paper.progress has been lacking to the extent of making it difficult for Belarus to fulfill its commitments
under the GATT. Section 6 discusses the applicability of the findings to other CIS countries and
concludes.
2. External Trade of Belarus since 1992
The former Belorussian Socialist Soviet Republic gained its political independence in late 1991,
becoming the Republic of Belarus. It has a population of approximately 10 million. Per capita
GDP, measured at purchasing power parity, is broadly comparable to the Central European
transition economies according to the World Bank (1994, Table 30). Belarus may be characterized
as a small open economy, with significant net exports of certain food products and particularly
capital goods (non-electric and electric machinery, transport equipment). Most external trade is
with the rest of the former Soviet Union. Belarus was the country most affected by the Chernobyl
nuclear accident. Several hundred thousand people have had to be resettled from contaminated
areas, and a significant amount of agricultural land has been withdrawn from use.
The analysis of the external trade of Belarus is complicated by the limited accuracy of the available
data. The political disintegration of the former Soviet Union was followed by disintegration of the
trade and monetary systems, rendering the traditional system of statistics less and less relevant. At
the same time, insufficient funding and lack of experience have held back the introduction of new
methodologies and procedures of data collection appropriate for an emerging market economy.
Table 1 juxtaposes the figures on external trade produced by Goskomstat Belarus with the estimates
used by the National Bank in their balance of payments statistics, as well as adjustments to the latter
by the staff of the International Monetary Fund. Goskomstat data are based on information
collected from enterprises that participate in external trade. The coverage and accuracy of these
data, however, have deteriorated significantly over the last couple of years as new trade channels
have opened up and many enterprises feel less compelled than in the past to report to Goskomstat.
Therefore the National Bank makes significant upward adjustments of these trade data when
producing the balance of payments, taking into account both foreign currency flows and customs
statistics.
2
It may be concluded from the data in Table 1 that intra-CIS trade accounted for roughly two thirds
of the value of total exports and imports in 1993. This estimate is approximately mid-way between
the figures from the National Bank and the IMF, and is also consistent with the preliminary data for
the first half of 1994 from the National Bank. It is more difficult, however, to draw firm
The accuracy of data on trade with non-CIS countries can also be assessed on the basis of partner country
statistics. Belamsian exports to the EU as given by Goskomstat are only 49 per cent of the corresponding figure
from EU statistics; for Belarusian imports that share is 70 per cent. This comparison is of course subject to
considerable uncertainty: different systems of valuation (fob vs. cif), the conversion of national currencies first
into Ecu and then into US-$, and the difficulty of identifying the country of origin of goods imported from the
former Soviet Union are all "legitimate" causes for the divergence. The much larger discrepancy for Belarusian
exports also suggests, however, that there have been significant illegal capital exports or tax avoidance. Even the
balance of payments data from the National Bank in Table 1 may therefore understate the true value of trade.conclusions regarding the evolution of trade flows since 1992.
3 Trade values with CIS countries
have been affected by a combination of high inflation and sharply deteriorating terms of trade of
Belarus. While the recorded trading volumes (measured in physical quantities) of individual
commodities have fallen sharply, the value of trade measured at current prices converted into
US dollars has only decreased moderately. In any case, the balance of trade has deteriorated
substantially from 1992 to 1993 in trade with both non-CIS and CIS countries.
The terms of trade loss was mainly the result of the dramatic increase in import prices for energy
materials from Russia. The compression of many other categories of imports to pay even for a
reduced amount of energy resources has lead to a redirection of Belarusian exports towards Russia.
The share of Russia in Belarusian trade with CIS countries is now approximately 80 per cent
(Table 2). This corresponds to roughly one half of total exports and imports if it is assumed that
CIS trade accounts for two thirds of total exports and imports. Next in importance among trading
partners came the European Union (including its new members joining in 1995) with 12 per cent of
total exports and 17 per cent of total imports. Other significant trading partners were the Ukraine,
East and South-East European (former CMEA) economies, several developing countries and the
United States.
Table 3 describes the commodity composition of external trade with Russia, other CIS states,
non-CIS countries, and all three country groups together in 1993. Again it is assumed that CIS trade
accounts for two thirds of the total, and the import and export shares of Russia in intra-CIS trade
are taken from Goskomstat statistics. In interpreting these data it should be borne in mind that they
do not cover all trade and, furthermore, coverage may well vary across commodity groups.
Nevertheless it becomes clear that the commodity composition differs substantially across the three
country groups.
On the export side, chemical products are supplied mainly to non-CIS markets where they account
for almost one third of exports. These comprise mainly industrial chemicals and fertilizers, which
are either highly standardized products or raw materials after only minor processing. By contrast,
the share of capital goods (machinery and transport equipment) in exports was more than one half
in the case of Russia and only slightly less for the other CIS republics, but less than one fifth in
Western markets. Apparently only a few product groups could stand up to the demands of the more
sophisticated Western markets. Other commodity groups such as mineral products (refined
petroleum products), textiles, and base metals contribute significantly to exports to all three regions.
Textile exports to Western markets, however, consist largely of synthetic fibres while those to CIS
countries also include fabrics, knitwear, and apparel.
3 This applies also to the share of trade in GDP which may be looked upon as an indicator of the openness of the
Belarusian economy. The data in Table 1 vary widely and seem exlremely high compared with figures usually
found in market economies. This may be due in part to the valuation of Belarusian GDP at the current exchange
rate. Under current conditions, this procedure attaches an extremely low value to non-traded goods and services as
well as to transactions at controlled prices, which were still significant in Belarus until 1994.Imports comprise mainly food products (from the West and "other" CIS countries), oil and gas
(Russia), chemical and pharmaceutical products (non-CIS), base metals and metal products
(predominantly "other" CIS), aiid machinery (predominantly non-CIS). Imports of the latter are
often facilitated by tied credits from Western governments, guaranteed by the Belarusian
government. Energy materials account for roughly two fifths of total imports.
In contrast to the Central European transition economies, there has been very little reorientation of
trade towards Western markets, or structural change in the commodity composition of trade.
4 Such
reorientation would require manufacturing enterprises to make substantial investments in areas such
as product development, quality control, and marketing in order to adapt their products to Western
standards in terms of quality, design, reliable delivery, and so on. The climate for such investment,
however, has been less than favourable. On the one hand, the pace of economic transformation has
been slow compared with many other transition economies (for a survey of developments see
DlWetal.). Macroeconomic instability, lack of structural adjustment, and the slow pace of
institutional reform Have led to considerable uncertainty regarding the long-term profitability of
investments. On the other hand, the trade and exchange rate regime in force throughout much of
1992 and 1993 reduced the profitability of exports compared with domestic sales.
Accession to the GATT/WTO would give an impetus both to economic transformation in general,
and to the reform of trade and exchange rate policy in particular. The influence of the state in the
economy, which is still extensive, will need to be reduced further if the Belarusian government is to
convince GATT contracting parties that the country is no longer a state trading economy, and
should therefore not be subject to the restrictions that this status involves. Furthermore, the
application of GATT rules will lead to greater transparency of the trade and exchange rate regime,
including the need to define clearly the objectives pursued through trade policy (Langhammer,
1994). The use of trade policy measures as instruments of state support for industrial restructuring
will be limited to the protection inherent in the level at which tariffs are bound at the time of
accession. GATT rules will also apply to trade policy integration within the CIS, which is high on
the agenda of the Belarusian government because of the great weight of the CIS in the external
trade of Belarus. Last but not least, the concentration of non-CIS exports on a limited number of
products implies vulnerability to safeguard measures by trading partners, and underlines the
importance of market access for Belarusian producers. These issues are discussed in turn in the
following sections.
3. Trade Policy Reform
International trade theory has demonstrated the equivalence of various trade and domestic policy
measures in achieving similar protectionist ends, such as tariffs or quotas on imports or exports, or
taxes on consumption or production (James Anderson, 1994). As the overriding objective of the
4 This observation is confumed by a detailed analysis of all the available trade data which is not included in this
paper due to lack of space (see Liicke, 1995).GATT is to reduce trade barriers in a mutually verifiable manner, it requires member countries to
obey certain rules in the formulation of their trade policies that promote transparency and attach
stringent conditions to the erection of new trade barriers. This sections discusses the need for
change in the trade policy regime of Belarus to achieve conformity with GATT.
The following GATT rules have a particular bearing on the Belarusian case. In principle, the GATT
only allows barriers to trade in the form of tariffs on imports or exports. Quantitative restrictions
therefore have to be converted into tariffs, unless they are permissible under exceptional
circumstances, for instance, on agricultural products (Article XI). Article II provides for the fixing
of maximum tariff levels (tariff binding) which cannot normally be altered unilaterally and are
reduced successively on a multilateral basis. Rules on customs valuation (Article VII) and upper
limits on other charges (such as customs user fees; Article VIII) are intended to.prevent contracting
parties from circumventing their commitments on tariff reductions. Article III also,stipulates that
domestic taxes be neutral as to the origin of the goods taxed.
Belarus currently has an import tariff schedule with an average rate below 7 per cent (independent
of whether an unweighted or an import-weighted average is used; Table 4).
5 The dispersion of
tariff rates across commodities is also modest, with only some luxury items carrying rates as high as
50 per cent (150 per cent for certain alcoholic beverages). Regarding average rates for larger
commodity groups, the highest rates are for consumer durables such as textiles at about 15 per cent.
It seems safe to state that at the present time there is no strong industrial policy motivation behind
the import tariff, with the possible exception of the protection of vodka producers. Like in most
other countries, however, there is an escalating tariff structure so that the effective protection of
manufacturing is higher than the nominal tariff rates seem to suppose.
Apart from these Most Favoured Nation tariff rates, there are preferential rates for developing
countries (half the MFN rate) and least developed countries (zero rates).
6 In addition, Belarus has
free trade agreements with the other CIS states providing for zero import tariffs (see Section 4). At
present Belarus does not have any specific provisions for imposing safeguard measures such as
antidumping or countervailing duties. As for non-tariff import barriers, there are licensing
requirements for a few chemical products, and an import ban for hazardous wastes which cannot be
processed in Belarus. Belarus also charges a small customs user fee on imports.
On the export side, Belarus maintains tariffs as well as quota and licensing requirements for a
number of products, mostly raw materials and intermediate goods (Table 5). These controls are
intended to ensure that there is a sufficient supply of goods to the domestic market even when
domestic prices are regulated and below the world market level! The tax level varies with the size
of the resource rent that the state is attempting to capture; some of the highest rates are for mineral
s The tariff structure is quite similar to that of Russia; see Section 4 below for the stale of trade policy integration
between the two countries.
6 Preferences for developing countries are covered by the Enabling Clause agreed in the Tokyo Round (see Senti,
1986, p. 113).oil products at more than 30 per cent. They apply to exports to both non-CIS and CIS countries,
with the exception of Russia. A free trade area between the two countries was implemented in May
1994 as the first stage of the economic and monetary union as laid out in the spring 1994 treaty.
There are export subsidies in the form of profit tax reductions on profits from exports, and the
cancellation of the VAT on certain exports to Russia.
Regarding domestic taxes, imports from non-CIS countries into Belarus are currently subject to the
Value Added Tax and excise taxes in addition to the import tariff. While technically the same rate
of VAT is used on imports and domestic goods, taxable value in the case of imports is not customs
value, but customs value plus the import tariff. Therefore ad-valorem taxes are effectively higher
for imports than for domestically produced goods. In line with the country of destination principle,
non-CIS exports are normally exempted from VAT and excise taxes. By contrast, the country of
origin principle is applied to VAT and excise taxes in trade with CIS countries, i.e. Belarusian
exports are taxed like goods in the domestic market while imports are tax-free.
GATT membership of Belarus will require a decision on the precise form of trade policy
integration with Russia and the remaining CIS countries. At present, the most likely prospect is for
free trade agreements with the individual states whose conformity with GATT Article XXIV would
need to be assured in each case (see Section 4 for a discussion of the policy options). It is plausible
to assume, therefore, that Belarus will remain free to set its own external (as opposed to intra-
regional) tariffs. Otherwise Belarus would have to accede to the GATT jointly with the other
members of a customs union in which it participates.
Then a decision will need to be made on the levels at which Belarusian tariffs are to be bound. The
example of many developing countries as weli as Slovenia demonstrates that tariffs might be bound
at a higher level than presently enforced. In this case, Belarus would not be obliged to cut its actual
tariffs even further in a future round of multilateral tariff reductions, but would only have the
maximum permissible levels reduced. Furthermore, Belarus would be free to increase its tariffs up
to the maximum (bound) levels, for example in pursuit of industrial policy objectives.
7
With, respect to its barriers to exports, GATT contracting parties may request that Belarus either
phase out its quantitative restrictions and licensing requirements, or convert these into export
tariffs, which could then be bound. There may also have to adjustments of a technical nature to
7 The attraction of tariff protection in the present situation is that it causes the cost of protection to be bom by
consumers, rather than by the government budget. Given the serious budgetary situation of the Belarusian
government, this traditional second-best argument for infant industry protection through tariffs becomes
relevant. - Under Article XVIII of the GATT, only developing countries may withdraw from previous
commitments on tariff levels if there is no alternative way of providing protection to infant industries. The
industrial restructuring required in Belarus presents some problems which are not dissimilar from those faced by
many developing countries in their industrialization process. Nevertheless, the status of Belarus as an "economy in
transition" has no legal meaning under the GATT (although it is explicitly mentioned, for example, in the recently
initialed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union). If Belarus wishes not to forego the
chance to use tariffs as instruments of industrial policy, it will have to bind tariffs at sufficiently high levels to
allow some scope for future increases.some transit and customs user fees. Domestic taxes will have to based on customs value rather than
on customs value plus the import tariff (as at present). This problem may be resolved, without a
loss of tax revenue, by raising import tariffs accordingly before binding tariff rates in the process of
accession.
4. Regional Integration with CIS countries
It has been pointed out in the Introduction that, in the medium run, the elimination of politically
motivated barriers to East-West trade will reduce the relative importance of inter-state trade among
CIS countries compared to trade with the rest of the world. Nevertheless, inter-state trade presently
accounts for a large proportion of total trade not only in Belarus (cf. Table 1), but also in all other
CIS countries except Russia. Considerable efforts have been made in the framework of the CIS, as
well as through bilateral and plurilateral agreements, to set up a customs union involving some or
all CIS countries. This section briefly describes the present state of inter-state economic relations,
and then discusses the potential benefits and costs of trade policy integration in the context of the
accession of Belarus to GATT.
Since 1992 the volume of inter-state trade has declined rapidly, due in large part to new obstacles to
inter-state deliveries of goods and payments. Many states imposed administrative barriers to certain
exports in order to maintain a sufficient supply of goods to the domestic market, or to export in
exchange for convertible currency. In addition, Russia gradually increased the prices of its energy
exports to the CIS countries from early 1992 onwards. The net energy importers among the latter
began to run up large trade deficits which have since de facto been financed by Russia under
increasingly stringent conditions. The monetary systems of the CIS countries were effectively
separated in mid-1992 when Russia forced all inter-state payments to go through correspondent
accounts at the Central Bank of Russia whose balances were limited by the amount of credit that
Russia was willing to extend. This cumbersome procedure led to long delays in the execution of
payment orders. The resulting decline in trade has contributed significantly to the fall of industrial
output and GDP in the CIS countries.
8
Progress was made only slowly towards establishing the institutions required for conducting inter-
state trade in a market-oriented framework. By 1994, nearly all CIS states had introduced national
currencies, most of which were de facto convertible for current account transactions. A reasonably
efficient system of inter-state payments now exists through correspondent accounts of commercial
banks. Credit from Russia to finance current account deficits is now denominated in US dollars,
and interest rates are fixed in relation to the Libor rate. Bilateral trade agreements among the CIS
and Baltic countries, which were initially concluded in order to balance bilateral trade flows and
8 It has been demonstrated that the decline in intra-CIS trade was partly exogenous in the sense that it was far larger
than would have been expected given the decline in aggregate demand in the former Soviet Union (John
Anderson, 1993).ensure sufficient supplies of strategic products by administrative means, are now mostly indicative
in character (see Section 5 for a more detailed analysis with respect to Belarus).
9
Against this background, the motivations of the individual CIS countries to pursue (or not to
pursue) strategies of intra-CIS regional integration differ considerably, especially between Russia
and the remaining, smaller republics. Nevertheless, certain economic benefits can be expected to
accrue broadly to all participating countries. Preventing further disintegration through new barriers
to trade would avoid the resulting reallocation of factors of production and the associated
adjustment cost. It would also promote the openness of national markets and help to maintain a
competitive environment (Hine, 1994).
The likely size of these effects depends on the future importance of intra-CIS in total trade, once
the reorientation of trade towards Western markets is completed. Gravity models have been used to
'explain' the value of trade between pairs of countries as a function of their incomes, populations,
geographic distance, trade policies (e.g. common membership in a preferential trade arrangement),
or cultural factors (e.g. common language). Gros and Dautrebande (1992) have applied coefficient
estimates from several such studies to predict the long-run "normal" trade flows of the Newly
Independent States once they have fully adjusted to market economy conditions. According to their
calculations, the trade of Belarus with all former member republics of the Soviet Union combined
will be no more than a quarter of total external trade, and trade with Russia no more than one tenth.
This result is driven by the large weight accorded to the high GDP of Western Europe, which
dominates the influence of geographic and cultural proximity to the newly independent states.
Several considerations suggest, however, that these estimates indicate a lower bound for the future
importance of Belarusian trade with CIS countries. First, national income in the former centrally
planned economies is notoriously difficult to estimate, and Gros and Dautrebande have used a
conservative (i.e. low) figure. In the simulations, this procedure will lead to similarly conservative
estimates for trade with the CIS countries. Second, the legacy of Soviet history - isolation from
Western markets, a common business culture, similar consumer preferences - may well exert a
stronger influence than factors such as a common language. Third, the development of the transport
infrastructure may be path dependent; for example, Belarus would probably continue importing
natural gas from Russia through existing pipelines even if cheaper supplies were temporarily
available in the world market. In sum, the economic benefits of trade policy integration (or, rather,
of avoiding further disintegration) are probably significant, though not as large as the present intra-
CIS trade flows suggest.
A second motivation for pursuing regional integration is particularly important from the point of
view of net energy importers in the CIS, such as Belarus. Russian export prices of energy materials,
particularly natural gas, have increased much faster than Russian domestic prices. This has not only
9 The evolution of the policy environment for CIS trade, and particularly the trade and payments system among the
CIS countries since 1992 have been extensively described elsewhere (for instance, DIW et al.; IMF, 1994).led to balance of payments problems for net importing countries, but has also distorted the supply
of energy-intensive products by subsidizing Russian producers. The abolition of restrictions on
intra-CIS trade, which would have to include the elimination of Russian export taxes on energy,
ought to equalize prices across the CIS countries.
In view of its large balance of payments deficit due to higher import prices for energy, Belarus has
actively pursued regional integration with Russia.
1
0 The first stage of the spring 1994 treaty on
Economic and Monetary Union between the two countries provides for the creation of a free trade
area in which no taxes of any kind should be levied on bilateral trade. It is difficult to understand
why energy prices are apparently still lower in Russia than in Belarus. While transport costs may
play a limited role, a more likely explanation is monopolistic practices by Gazprom and other
Russian state enterprises, or continuing price controls in Russia which are not applied to inter-state
trade. It remains to be seen whether the Russian government is really willing to extend the benefit
of subsidized energy prices to Belarus, and whether it is in a position to put sufficient pressure on
energy exporters to make this happen.
A third motivation for CIS trade policy integration may be that it would create an enlarged
protected market for industries in the region. This touches upon the related issues of whether
integration should be in the form of a customs union or a free trade area, and whether trade policy
instruments should be used for purposes of industrial policy. In a free trade area, member countries
are free to conduct their external trade policies independently. Hence the amount of protection that
an industry enjoys outside its national market is limited by the preference margins in the other
regional markets. If substantial protection is to be given to specific industries throughout the region,
a customs union with a common external trade policy is therefore required.
A customs union raises the question of how decisions on a common trade policy are taken when
one member (i.e. Russia) dominates the others by its sheer economic size. This problem Has been
impossible to solve in the CIS framework because the smaller countries were not willing to give up
their policy-making autonomy on foreign trade. A customs union also raises the question of how
tariff revenue is to be shared among the member countries, since a product that has entered one
member country of the union can, in principle at least, be moved across intra-regional borders
without further customs charges. By contrast, a free trade area requires customs controls at the
internal borders, and a system of certificates of origin to identify goods produced in the region and
therefore subject to the preferential regime. Compared with a customs union, a free trade area
would imply an increase in bureaucracy and the scope for corruption. On the other hand, the
1
0 An alternative strategy might have involved Belarus charging Russia fully for the use of pipelines crossing
Belarusian territory, military installations etc., but paying world market prices for oil and gas imported from
Russia. Although precise figures are not available, it has been suggested that applying similar charges as Poland
would have created an income to Belarus equivalent to the potential gain from paying Russian domestic energy
prices. It would also have made Belarus independent of supply cuts, and of. future rises in Russian domestic
energy prices. This approach has not been chosen by die Belarusian government, however, and may have been
politically infeasible because, on the Russian side, it would have involved an additional burden for the
government budget while providing extra income to energy exporters.10
preferences of the individual countries for protecting particular industries are likely to differ, and a
free trade area would allow its members some autonomy in setting their trade policies.
1
1
In principle, tariffs may constitute a second-best instrument of industrial policy when government
budgets are tight, and subsidies to correct externalities directly cannot be financed. Some scepticism
is warranted, however, with respect to the use of tariff protection for purposes of industrial policy
in the CIS countries. First, it is not clear how sectors should be selected for support. Measuring the
external effects produced by a sectors, and weighing them against the cost of protection is
intrinsically difficult in stable economic conditions, and even more so in rapidly transforming
economies. Second, by offering protection the government would become a target for the lobbying
efforts of interest groups, and it is likely that political rather than economic criteria would
ultimately dominate decision-making on industrial policy (see Grossman and Helpman, 1994).
Since 1994 at least, Belarus has more or less copied Russian foreign trade regulations and has
thereby maintained a de facto customs union, without formally giving up its autonomy over foreign
trade. This has been feasible because Russian import tariffs, on the whole, have been low, and
conflicts of interest have not arisen. In the medium term, however, it is not unlikely that industrial
interests may gain greater influence over Russian trade policy. In this case the industrial policy
priorities of Belarus will probably differ from Russia's, and a common trade policy will be
infeasible. Possibly for this reason, Belarus has also set up a system of issuing certificates of origin
for Belarusian goods, thereby preparing for a free trade area with diverging national trade policies.
Finally, any decision about formal trade policy integration will be influenced also by political
considerations. Even if economic benefits are limited, participation in an integration scheme may
guarantee a small country like Belarus access to an important market that would be insecure
otherwise. On the other hand, Russia's interest in forming a customs union with CIS countries (in
spite of the loss of income if Russian domestic energy prices come to prevail throughout the region)
may flow from its desire to establish itself as the dominant regional power, and to maintain control
over the external economic relations of countries in the 'near abroad".'
2
Accession to GATT will require Belarus to clarify its approach to regional trade policy integration.
Article XXIV of the GATT permits the creation of customs unions or free trade areas comprising
the territories of GATT contracting parties. Any free trade area that includes GATT members as
well as non-members therefore requires a waiver (as laid down in Article XXV) with respect to the
provisions of Article XXTV. After a transition period, substantially all trade originating in the
member countries must be free from tariffs and other trade barriers. Judging from current
intentions, this condition would probably be fulfilled by any future trade agreement between
Belarus and Russia or other CIS countries.
1
1 For example, Russia might be interested in high tariffs on certain types of machinery, whereas Belarus depends on
imports of such machinery from OECD countries for the modernization of its manufacturing industries.
1
2 The perceived loss of income would be reduced to the extent that Russia feels compelled, for political reasons, to
continue financing a large proportion of the imports of the smaller CIS states through soft credits.11
Problems may arise, however, if the members of a CIS trade integration scheme do not enter GATT
simultaneously, or some do not enter at all. This seems likely at the present time because the CIS
countries are pursuing their GATT membership applications independently, and there is no obvious
reason why these negotiations should come to conclusion at the same time. In particular, Russia has
recently appeared to accord less importance to GATT membership than may have been the case
earlier. If Belarus intends to proceed towards GATT membership as fast as planned, and
simultaneously attaches high priority to integration with Russia in order to obtain lower import
prices for energy, it may indeed have to apply for a GATT waiver with respect to Article XXIV.
In view of the recent plans for a customs union involving Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, it is
important to note that Belarus can only accede to GATT individually if it retains full autonomy
over its trade policy and all other GATT-related policy areas (Article XXXIII). If a proper customs
union with joint decision-making on trade policy were actually implemented, it is difficult to see
how Belarus could enter into any binding commitments vis-a-vis GATT contracting parties, and at
the same time abide by its obligations towards its partners in the customs union.
5. Systemic Reform
The GATT treaty implicitly assumes that contracting parties are market economies where state
trading is limited to a small number of enterprises, if it exists at all. This exceptional case is dealt
with in Article XVII which defines a state trading enterprise by the existence of exclusive or special
rights or privileges, rather than ownership. Article XVII also states that the activities of state
trading enterprises may create obstacles to the expansion to trade, and that such obstacles should be
removed through negotiations on the basis of reciprocity, and in a mutually beneficial manner.
Although the wording of Article XVII is not very specific, concerns about pervasive state trading
have meant that centrally planned economies acceding to GATT were required to accept special
commitments on increasing imports from GATT contracting parties (for example, Poland and
Romania in the 1960s and 1970s). At the same time, the exports of GATT members among the
centrally planned economies were subject to special safeguard mechanisms on the part of trading
partners. Similar issues are now coming up in the negotiations with economies in transition where
the state still plays an important role in the economy. This section first explores the likely concerns
of GATT contracting parties, and then examines their relevance in the context of Belarus.
1
3
The presence of state trading enterprises can undermine the rights of GATT contracting parties in
several ways, and verification of violations may be difficult. State trading enterprises may
discriminate among trading partners on other than commercial grounds (non-discrimination or most
favoured nation principle; Article I). Further, they may apply (prohibited) quantitative import
restrictions (Article XI), or introduce markups that exceed the level at which a country has bound
its import tariffs. Such practices will become less likely to the extent that de-monopolization and
1
3 See Low (1994), on which part of this section is based, for a detailed discussion.12
privatization are implemented in the transition economies. The negotiations on the accession of
transition economies will probably focus on specific commitments with respect to the pace of such
reforms (as in the case of China), rather than setting targets for import expansion as in the past.
On the export side, there is a suspicion among GATT members that centrally planned economies
had a greater tendency than market economies to subsidize industries in ways that lacked
transparency. This issue is related to state trading but does not bear directly on Article XVII.
Contracting parties therefore insisted on maintaining selective safeguard mechanisms that could
easily be applied to counter alleged sectoral targeting, or any subsidization of production or exports
implicit in an administered price regime. Such treatment, if applied to the economies in transition,
could jeopardize improvements in market access.
In Belarus the transformation of the economic system had progressed only slowly until 1994 (see
DIW et al.). State orders to enterprises still played a significant role for essential intermediate and
consumer products, although their scope had been reduced in relation to earlier years. Some prices
were still directly controlled, and practically all internal trade was subject to limits on profit
margins. Direct budgetary subsidies to various sectors of the economy amounted to 14 per cent of
GDP in 1993, and do not seem to have declined in 1994. Directed credits from the National Bank to
enterprises through commercial banks also contained a large subsidy element because they were
granted at substantially negative real interest rates. The privatization program had made very little
progress by the end of 1994.
Market-oriented reform can be expected to gain momentum due to the agreement between the
Belarusian government and the IMF concluded in December 1994. Government expenditures,
especially subsidies to consumers and enterprises, are to be reduced substantially, and the remaining
deficit will be financed by foreign aid and government borrowing in the domestic capital market,
rather than through central bank credit. Directed credit from the central bank to enterprises will be
phased out, and the refinancing rate for commercial banks will be positive in real terms. De-
monopolization and privatization, including wholesale and retail trade, are also high on the agenda.
If this program is fully implemented, it can be expected to go a long way towards allaying the
concerns of GATT contracting parties with respect to an excessive role of the state in the
Belarusian economy.
In the area of external trade, the Belarusian government has played a particularly important role in
trade with the CIS countries. The status of imports under the annual bilateral agreements concluded
with the CIS countries since 1992 merits some attention. Initially, the agreements explicitly set
quantities and prices for a core group of products, mostly raw materials. These deliveries were
based on state orders to enterprises or, later on, government procurement from enterprises, and
were supposed to be free from trade taxes. Deliveries of other commodities were subject to
contracts between enterprises, but export licences would automatically be issued in fulfillment of
the agreed quotas. However, fulfillment ratios for the bilateral agreements tended to be erratic and,
on average, low. Many CIS governments were either unable or unwilling to enforce state contractsBlbliothek
fur
or, as in the case of Russia, abolished the system of state orders as part of their systemic reform.
Correspondingly, trade between enterprises became more important so that, overall, the trade of
Belarus with the CIS countries is now much more market-determined, and less bilateralized, than
only two years ago.
In 1994, trade agreements existed between Belarus and all CIS states except Georgia, plus
Lithuania and Latvia. Similar agreements are planned for 1995. The 1994 agreements delegate
responsibility for deliveries to certain government ministries or procurement agents (for instance,
the Ministry of Resources - the former Gossnab - in Belarus and Roskontrakt in Russia). Quotas are
not binding, and prices are to be negotiated for each individual delivery.
1
4 Deliveries under the
agreements are not subject to import or export taxes. Table 6 gives an impression of the extent of
the commodity coverage of the 1994 and 1995 agreements. Not all major commodities are covered
by the agreements; one exception, for instance, is imports of natural gas from Russia into Belarus
which are handled directly by Gazprom in Russia and Beltransgaz in Belarus. The commodity
coverage differs considerably across countries. Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and
Kazakhstan are particularly detailed, while the number of commodities covered in the agreements
with Russia (where economic reform has progressed faster than elsewhere in the CIS) is
comparatively low. The number of tentative quotas for 1995 is lower than in 1994 for all countries
except Russia where the commodity coverage is already quite limited in the 1994 agreement.
It seems safe to state that the agreements are today indicative rather than binding. It is not apparent
that enterprises are under pressure to participate in the agreements, or that they receive special
privileges in return for their participation. From their point of view, the main function of the
agreements is probably that they facilitate the marketing of output in the present, volatile, economic
and political situation of the CIS countries. To the extent that imports under die bilateral
agreements are distributed within Belarus by the Ministry of Resources, the planned de-
monopolization and privatization of wholesale trade can be expected to eliminate any monopolistic
elements that may be involved. In sum, it seems unlikely that intra-CIS trade would be very
different from what it is now in the absence of the bilateral agreements.
The second major issue in relation to systemic reform is how market access of Belarusian products
in GATT member countries would be affected by the persistence of domestic subsidies, either
directly from the government budget or indirectly through a lack of financial discipline on the part
of Belarusian enterprises. In general terms, the implementation of the December 1994 agreement
between the Belarusian government and the International Monetary Fund should go a long way
towards eliminating suspicions of dumping or improper subsidization, which might otherwise
provide a justification for anti-dumping or countervailing duties. It is useful, however, to review the
present rules for market access of Belarusian products in OECD countries (the most important
1
4 For instance, the agreement between Russia and Belarus for 1994 stipulates only that for most deliveries
"contract" prices are to be used, as opposed to prices fixed in government statutes or special inter-enterprise
agreements which are to be used only in exceptional cases.14
export markets of Belarus outside the CIS), and to examine some of the issues that may give rise to
concern.
The former Soviet Union was not a GATT contracting party. Hence the trade policies of partner
countries were not subject to GATT discipline, for instance with respect to the non-discrimination
principle. As a result, the former Soviet Union faced both higher tariffs and more extensive non-
tariff barriers than other country groups. This situation improved somewhat when most major
OECD countries granted MFN status to the CIS countries in 1992 and 1993 and frequently included




In the case of the European Union, the most important trading partner of Belarus in the West, GSP
treatment has so far been granted by the EU on a provisional basis. Nevertheless, average EU tariffs
on total imports from the CIS, including Belarus, are still higher than for other important third
countries with more generous preference schemes, for instance EFTA, ACP, Visegrad countries
(Europe Agreements), and Baltic countries (Free Trade Agreements). MFN and GSP treatment will
become permanent under the recently initialed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which also
provides for the application of GATT rules on safeguard measures.
As regards Belarusian exports, concerns of partner governments are likely to centre around the lack
of financial discipline, or soft budget constraints, on the part of enterprises. This is epitomized by
the fact that so far not a single enterprise in Belarus has been allowed to go bankrupt. Soft budget
constraints might allow insolvent enterprises to produce and export quite independently of costs,
and still remain in business with the help of subsidies. Besides, state trading organizations still
account for a significant share of Belarusian exports. In practice, however, their role seems to be
limited to certain important raw materials, such as fertilizer.
1
6 There is no indication that
enterprises are not free to use alternative export channels, or to set up their own, if they wish.
In the negotiations on accession to GATT, commitments might therefore be requested of the
Belarusian government (possibly in line with its December 1994 agreement with the IMF) on the
elimination of direct and indirect subsidies, and on a more rapid pace of privatization. On the basis
of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Belarus may also be asked to declare and bind its
support to the agricultural sector. As a side effect of the likely emphasis of GATT contracting
parties on subsidy reductions, Belarus may find it difficult in the future to employ export or
production subsidies for the purpose of industrial policy (such a strategy was pursued by the newly
industrializing countries in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s). Exports could become subject to
safeguard measures, unless subsidies were strictly focussed on correcting externalities, and avoided
any semblance of sectoral targeting.
1
5 A detailed description of the changes in OECD country trade policies towards the CIS countries is provided by
Kaminski and Yeais (1993).
1
6 An anti-dumping measure was imposed by the EU Commission in 1992 against import of potash fertilizer from
Belarus (KEG, 1993).15
6. Conclusions
Accession to GATT would have a significant impact upon current economic policy in Belarus by
obliging the government to enter into binding commitments in key areas. At the most general level,
systemic reform will have to be accelerated in order to convince partner countries that Belarus is
firmly progressing towards a market economy, and should therefore not be subjected to the special
conditions and discriminatory treatment formerly reserved for centrally planned (state trading)
economies. In particular, internal trade at the wholesale and retail level needs to be de-monopolized
and privatized in order to permit verification of commitments on import barriers. Financial
discipline on the part of enterprises needs to be tightened to dispel fears of dumping, and subsidies
need to cut in order to avoid charges of domestic industries being granted unfair advantages.
In negotiations on accession to GATT, Belarus will also be requested to make commitments, such
as binding its import and export tariff levels, that will limit its future autonomy in the field of trade
policy. It will be important, therefore, to define clearly the objectives to be pursued, such as
granting protection to infant industries, or raising fiscal revenue. Care will have to be taken to
ensure that regional integration with other CIS countries, especially Russia, is GATT-consistent. In
the short-run, integration will be particularly attractive for Belarus if it enables the country to
benefit from substantially lower import prices for energy than at present. It is doubtful, however,
whether it would be in the long-term interest of Belarus to remain dependent on production
technologies which are excessively energy-intensive by the standard of world market prices.
On balance, it may be stated that accession to GATT can provide a focal point for policy decisions
that would have to be taken at any rate sooner or later, but now have to be dealt with
simultaneously and under scrutiny from partner governments. This is likely to enhance the
consistency of the decisions ultimately taken, and the support of partner governments in the form of
acceptance into GATT can strengthen the credibility of the policies concerned.
Since Belarus (like the other CIS countries) has already obtained most favoured nation status and
GSP treatment from the OECD countries, its immediate gains from GATT membership in terms of
enhanced market access will be limited. Belarus may become less vulnerable, however, to
safeguard measures taken by its trading partners on the grounds of alleged dumping or unfair
subsidies. On the other hand, if Belarus failed to accede to GATT and make the necessary
commitments to systemic reform, the concessions made so far by trading partners on a preliminary
basis might not be permanent, and the trade policy status of Belarus could revert back to that of a
centrally planned economy.
Many of these conclusion should also apply to most other CIS countries. The importance of
maintaining market access in GATT member countries obviously depends on the relative weights
of intra-CIS and other trade, as well as on the policies of natural trading partners such as large
neighboring countries (for instance, Iran and Turkey in the case of the southern republics). Other
problems, however, will be broadly similar, such as the need to formulate trade policy in16
accordance with well-defined objectives, or to clarify the form of regional integration with Russia
and the remaining CIS countries.17
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to Appendix 2 of the Import Tariff Schedule (except former Yugoslavia). -
eAccording to Appendix 3 of the Import Tariff schedule.
Source: Goskomstat Belarus; own calculations.Table 3 - Belarus: Commodity Composition of Trade with Russia, other CIS and Third Countries, 1993 (per cent of trade with eachfcountry group)
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Vegetable products




Plastics, rubber, and articles thereof
Leather and articles thereof
Wood and articles of wood
Pulp, paper and paper products
Textiles and textile articles
Footwear, headgear and accessories
Stone, clay, and glass products
Pears, precious metals and stones
Base metals and metal products
Machinery and equipment; electrical
goods
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All products (per cent of total trade


































































































































































































aThe share of Non-CIS in total trade has been set at 33.3 per cent. The share of Russia in the intra-CIS trade of Belarus has been set at 69.2 per cent of exports and 76.9
per cent of imports in accordance with Goskomstat.
Source: Unpublished working documents of Goskomstat Belarus; own calculations.Table 4 - Belarus: Import Tariff by Commodity Groups, 1994
Product code
a (harmonized system)
I Live Animals; animal products
II Vegetable products
10 Cereals
1001 Wheat and meslin
1003 Barley
1005 Maize or com
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous
grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medical
plants;
straw and fodder
1208 Flours and meals of oil seeds or oleaginous fruits
(excl. mustard)
III Animal or vegetable fats and oils
15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage
products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable
waxes
1512 Sunflower-seed, safflower or cotton-seed oil and
fractions thereof; whether or not refined, but not
chemically modified
1515 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, incl. jojoba oil, and
their fractions, whether or not refined, but not
chemically modified (excl. soya-bean, ground-nut,
olive, palm, sunflower-seed, safflower, cotton-
seed, coconut, pal kernel, babassu, rape, colza and
mustard oil
IV Prepared foodstuffs
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery
1701 Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, in
solid form
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruits, nuts or other parts
of plants
V Mineral products
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their
distillation; bituminous substances; mineral
waxes
2710 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous
minerals (excl. crude); preparations containing
> = 70% by weight of petroleum oils or of oils
obtained from Bituminous minerals, these oils




2905 Acyclic alcohol and their halogenated, sulphonated,
nitrated ornitrosated derivatives
2931 Organo-inorganic compounds NES
30 Pharmaceutical products
3004 Medicaments consisting of mixed or unmixed
products for therapeutic or prophylactic uses, in
measured doses or put up for retail sale (excl.
goods of headings 3002,2005 or 3006)




















































































































32 Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their
derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring
matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other
mastics; inks
38 Miscellaneous chemical products
3808 Insecticides, rodenlicides, fungicides, herbicides,
germination inhibitors and plant-growth
regulators, disinfectants and similar products, put
up for retail sale or as preparations or articles, e.g.
sulphur-reated band, wicks and candles, and fly-
papers
Vll Plastics, rubber, and articles thereof
39 Plastics and plastic products
40 Rubber and articles thereof
4001 Natural rubber, balata, gutta-percha, guayule, chicle
and similar natural gums, in primary forms or in
plates, sheets or strip
VIII Leather and articles thereof
IX Wood and articles of wood
X Pulp, paper and paper products
XI Textiles and textile articles
62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not
knitted or crocheted
XII Footwear, headgear and accessories
XIII Stone, clay, and glass products
XIV Pearls, precious metals and stones
XV Base metals and metal products
73 Articles of iron or steel
7308 Structures and parts of structures "for example.
bridges and bridge-sections, lock-gates, towers,
lattice masts, roofs, roofing frameworks, doors and
windows and their frames and thresholds for doors,
shutters, balustrades, pillars and columns", of iron
or steel; plates, rods, angles, shapes, sections.
tubes and the like, prepared for use in structures,
of iron or steel (excl. prefabricated buildings of
heading No. 9406)
XVI Machinery and equipment; electrical goods
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and
mechanical appliances; parts thereof
842490 Parts of fire extinguishers, spray guns and similar
appliances, steam or sand blasting machines and
similar jet projecting machines and machinery and
apparatus for projecting, dispersing or spraying
liquids or powder NES
8430 Moving, grading, levelling, scraping, excavating,
tamping, compacting, extracting or boring
machinery, for earth, minerals or ores; pile-drivers
and pile-extractors; snow-ploughs and snow-
blowers (excl. those mounted on railway wagons,
motor vehicle chassis or lorries, self-propelled
machinery of heading No. 8429, lifting, handling,
Loading or unloading machinery of heading
Nos. 8425 10 8428and hand-operated tools)



















































































































8438 Machinery, not specified or included elsewhere in
this chapter, for the industrial preparation or
manufacture of food or drink (other than
machinery for the extraction or preparation of
animal or fixed vegetable fats or oils
8451 Machinery (excl. of heading 8450) for washing,
cleaning, wringing, drying, ironing, pressing incl.
fusing presses, bleaching, dyeing, dressing,
finishing, coating or impregnating textile yarns,
fabrics or made-up textile articles and for applying
paste to the base fabric or other support used in the
manufacture of floor coverings like linoleum;
machines for reeling, unreeling, foldings, cutting
or pinking textile fabrics
8452 Sewing machines other than book-sewing machines
of heading No. 8440; furniture, bases and covers
specially designed for sewing machines; sewing
machine needles
8460 Machine-tools for deburring, sharpening, grinding,
honing, lapping, polishing or otherwise finishing
metal, sintered metal carbides or cermets by
means of grinding stones, abrasives or polishing
products (excl. gear cutting, gear grinding or gear
finishing machines of heading No. 8461 and
machines for working in the hand)
847989 Machines and mechanical appliances NES
85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts
thereof; sound recorders and reproducers,
television image and sound recorders and
reproducers, and parts and accessories of such
articles
XVII Vehicles and other transport equipment
87 Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-
stock, and parts and accessories thereof
8708 Parts and accessories for tractors, motor vehicles for
the transport of ten or more persons, motor cars
and other motor vehicles principally designed for
the transport of person, motor vehicles for the
transport of goods and special purpose motor
vehicles of
heading Nos. 8701 to 8705, NES
X VTH Instruments and apparatus
90 Optical, Photographic, cinematographic, measuring,
checking, precision, medical or surgical
instruments and apparatus; pans and accessories
thereof
XIX Arms and ammunition
XX Miscellaneous manufactured articles
































Commodity groups are listed if they account for at least 1 per cent of 1993 non-CIS imports.
Source: Council of Minister, Decree No. 298,29 April 1994; Goskomstat Belarus; own calculations.Table 5 - Belarus: Commodity Coverage of Export Tax, Quota and Licensing Requirements
Commodity code (harmonized system)
01 Live animals
02 Meat and edible meat offal
03 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic
invertebrates
04 Dairy products of animal origin, not elsewhere
specified or included
05 Products of animal origin not elsewhere specified or
included
10 Cereals
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains,
seeds and fruit; industrial or medical plants; straw and
fodder
13 Lacs; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and
extracts
16 Preparations of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or
other aquatic invertebrates
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar
25 Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering material,
lime and cement
26 Ores, slag and ash
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their
distillation; bituminous substance; mineral waxes





























































Commodity code (harmonized system)
28 Inorganic chemicals: organic or inorganic compounds
of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of




34 Soaps, organic surface-active agents, washing
preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial
waxes, prepared waxes, shoe polish, scouring powder
and the like, candles and similar products, modelling
pastes, dental wax and plaster-based dental
preparations
39 Plastics and plastic products
40 Rubber and articles thereof
41 Hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather
44 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal
47 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material;
waste and scrap of paper or paperboard
71 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious
stone, precious metals, metals clad with precious
metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin
72 Iron and Steel
73 Articles of iron or steel
74 Copper and articles thereof








x up to 5 x
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Commodity code (harmonized system)
75 Nickel and articles thereof
76 Aluminium and articles thereof
78 Lead and articles thereof
79 Zinc and articles thereof
80 Tin and articles thereof
81 Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof
82 Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base
metal; parts thereof of base metal
85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts
thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television
image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts
and accessories of such articles
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof
89 Ships, boats and Floating structures
90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring.
checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments
and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof
91 Clocks and watches and parts thereof
93 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof





































































Source: Council of Ministers, Decree No. 301, 29 April 1994; Decree No. 344, 25 May 1993, as amended by Decree No. 301, 29 April 1994; Goskomstat
Belarus; own calculations.Table 6 - Belarus: Commodity Coverage of Bilateral Trade Agreements with CIS and Baltic Countries, 1994-1995
(number of commodities)
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Source: Unpublished Working Documents of the Economic Research Institute.